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THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION AND
THE FAILURE TO WARN OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS: TAKING THE "PROTECTION" OUT
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
In 1946, Congress passed the Federal Torts Claim Act
(FTCA),1 which largely eliminated the long-standing tradition of
sovereign immunity. The Act allowed many tort actions to proceed
against the government that courts had traditionally dismissed be-
cause of the shield of immunity surrounding the federal govern-
ment.2 Under the Act, the government could be found liable-
much like a private individual-for negligence under general princi-
ples of tort law.3 In eliminating general sovereign immunity, how-
ever, Congress was careful to carve out exceptions to the FTCA's
declaration of potential government tort liability. 4 One of the most
ambiguous and troublesome of these exceptions created by Con-
gress was the discretionary function exception. 5 This exception
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
2 See Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The Federal
Tort Claims Act is a broad waiver by Congress of the United States' immunity from
actions based on the tortious conduct of federal employees."); see also WILLIAM B.
WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT 6 (1957) ("The intent of the Federal Tort
Claims Act was the acceptance of liability under circumstances that could bring private
liability into existence and was not the creation of new causes of action."); William P.
Kratzke, The Convergence of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
with Limitations of Liability in Common Law Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 221, 221 (1986)
("The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by Congress in 1946 as a means of providing
compensation to those injured by the negligent acts of government employees without
continually imposing upon Congress and the President the burden of 'disposing of such
matters by private claim bills.'" (quoting S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1942)).,
3 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the pro-
visions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages.").
4 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988) (listing 13 different exceptions to liability under the
FTCA).
5 See generally 5 KENNETH C. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 27:11 (1978):
The discretionary function exception has always been somewhat of an
enigma to the courts.... Almost everything any administrator does in-
volves discretion, and the literal words clearly and unambiguously say
that the government is not liable for abuse of discretion. Yet Congress
could not have intended the discretionary function exception to cancel
out the rest of the FTCA.
id.; Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental
Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1991) ("Despite over forty-five years of
implementation, no coherent framework for applying the discretionary function excep-
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eliminates from general tort liability those government actions that
are "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused."6 Defining a discretionary func-
tion and determining what discretion Congress intended to protect
by this exception has engendered excessive litigation and inconsis-
tent judicial application of the exception by the courts. 7
A particular area of concern over the application of the discre-
tionary function exception is the role of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and its duty to warn of ascertained
environmental hazards. Possible tortious liability arises when the
EPA suspects a violation or hazard involving toxic waste and deter-
mines that the toxicity of the waste of a particular site exceeds an
acceptable level, but then fails to warn those most likely to be af-
fected by the toxic waste of the hazard. Affected parties have
brought tort actions against the government for failing to warn
them of detected environmental hazards. Courts frequently have
found the failure to warn as within the discretionary function excep-
tion, and therefore unactionable, and dismissed such claims summa-
rily.8 These cases reflect the view that the warning of affected
parties is a discretionary function of the EPA or government in gen-
eral and therefore protected from action under the FTCA by the
exception. Other courts, however, have held that such a failure to
warn is actionable.9 Whether Congress intended to protect this type
of agency discretion from liability under the discretionary function
exception has created considerable confusion among the circuits.
This Note traces the history of the discretionary function excep-
tion and presents specific applications of the exception to instances
tion exists."); D. Scott Barash, Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and
Mandatory Regulations, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1987) ("Because the drafters of the
FTCA failed to define the term 'discretionary function,' the discretionary function ex-
ception has become the most litigated provision of a much litigated statute."); Terri
Stilo, Note, Failure to Warn of a Known Environmental Danger: Limits on United States Liability
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 6 PACE ENvrL. L. REV. 589, 589 (1989) (noting
the "confusion surrounding application of the discretionary function exception").
6 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
7 See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (stating that it is
impossible "to define with precision every contour of the discretionary function excep-
tion"); Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1991) (claiming that the
Supreme Court has not been consistent in its application of the exception); Dube v.
Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that law in this area has
been a "patchwork quilt" rather than a "seamless web").
8 See Lockett, 938 F.2d at 639; Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987); Cisco v. United States, 768
F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1985).
9 See Dube, 870 F.2d at 790.
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of governmental failure to warn of environmental hazards. The
Note then explains how these applications of the discretionary func-
tion fail to consider and apply existing statutory and regulatory lan-
guage that implies a duty to warn on the part of the EPA. Even
assuming that no duty to warn exists, this Note argues that courts
have erroneously classified the failure to warn of environmental
hazards as an economic, social, or political issue and have ignored
its charactei-ization as a safety decision. This Note also addresses
counter-arguments raising concerns about separation of power and
judicial review. Finally, this Note discusses the unique and danger-
ous consequences of improperly applying the discretionary function
exception to shield governmental failure to warn of known environ-
mental hazards.
I
THE CURRENT STANDARD OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
To understand the discretionary function exception and its ap-
plication to environmental hazard cases, a brief history of judicial
treatment of the exception leading to the current standard is neces-
sary. Four Supreme Court cases comprise the main jurisprudence
surrounding the discretionary function exception. The Court first
treated the exception in Dalehite v. United States,'0 in which the gov-
ernment was excused from liability for deaths and injuries resulting
from an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer the government
had stored in Texas Harbor. The Court held that the plan formu-
lated by the government for the production and storage of such fer-
tilizer, and the methods chosen to carry it out, were acts of
discretion protected from liability under the FTCA by the discre-
tionary function exception."I According to the Court, the exception
was to be applied broadly to cover not only "the initiation of pro-
grams and activities" but also "determinations made by executives
or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules
of operations." The exception also covers the "acts of subordinates
in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with of-
ficial directions."' 12 Hence, Dalehite suggested that the discretionary
function exception protected any government action that involved
some level of policy discretion, regardless of whose discretion was
involved or on what grounds the discretion was exercised.' 3
10 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
11 Id. at 40-42.
12 Id. at 35-36.
13 See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Time for Reconsideration 42 OKaA. L. REv. 459, 459 (1989) (arguing that Dalehite
545
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Shortly after Dalehite, the Court significantly narrowed the ex-
ception in Indian Towing Co. v. United States.' 4 In this case, the Court
upheld government liability for the Coast Guard's failure to main-
tain and repair a lighthouse and its failure to warn that the light-
house was not functioning properly. In reaching its decision, the
Court recognized a distinction between planning level and opera-
tional level discretion.15 The "planning" level involves governmen-
tal policymaking or establishment of goals and programs for the
economic and social well-being of the country. 16 The "operational"
level, by contrast, consists of the day-to-day operation of that
body.17 Therefore, once the Coast Guard exercised its discretion at
the planning level to operate the lighthouse and "engendered reli-
ance" on this course of action, it was obligated to use due care in
this bperation. If the Coast Guard failed to use due care in operat-
ing and maintaining the lighthouse and damage resulted, the gov-
ernment could be held liable for its negligence.' 8 This failure to
take due care included the government's failure to warn those rely-
ing on the lighthouse that it was not functioning properly.' 9 Indian
Towing, therefore, narrowed the applicability of the discretionary
function exception and devised a planning/operational distinction
that would guide courts for the next 30 years. 20
In a later Supreme Court case, United States v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), the Court addressed grow-
ing concern over the boundaries of the discretionary function ex-
gave a "broad reading" to the discretionary function exception); Barash, supra note 5, at
1312 (stating that the Dalehite Court construed the discretionary function exception
broadly by failing to "distinguish carefully between the policyjudgment to proceed with
the fertilizer shipment program and the implementation of the policy directive.").
14 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
15 Id. at 68; see also Reynolds, supra note 13, at 460 (stating that the planning versus
operational distinction from Indian Towing provided a "more limiting reading of the ex-
ception"). Interestingly, the Dalehite Court had made a similar distinction in its discus-
sion of the boundaries of the discretionary function exception. See 346 U.S. at 42 ("The
decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational
level .... "). Its concept of planning level discretion, however, was very broad and
encompassed all decisions and actions involved in the case.
16 Reynolds, supra note 13, at 461.
17 Id.
18 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
19 Id.
20 Krent, supra note 5, at 880 ("For the next thirty years, the lower courts applied
the planning versus operational level distinction, with varying emphases. In general,
broad policies formulated by government were protected, but applications of those poli-
cies were not."); see, e.g.,Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983); Green
v. United States, 629 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1980); Gibson v. United States, 567 F.2d 1237
(3rd Cir. 1977); Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Mahler v.
United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3rd Cir. 1962); Friday v. United States, 239 F.2d 701 (9th
Cir. 1957).
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ception.2' This case represented claims against the United States
Government arising from several aircraft accidents. The plaintiffs
brought an action against the FAA for failing to detect the specific
problems that led to the accidents and for negligently certifying air-
craft design and manufacture in general.22 The Court, finding that
these claims against the FAA fell within the discretionary function
exception, dismissed the claims. In so holding, the Court ignored
any planning/operational level distinction and returned to the prior,
more broad version of discretionary function exception expressed in
Dalehite.23 Seeking to discard any bright line test, the Varig Airlines
Court stated that it was the nature of the conduct, not the status of
the governmental actor, that guided the applicability of the excep-
tion.24 According to the Varig Court, the exception covered not
only agency policy and program formation. It also covered the dis-
cretionary actions of agency employees in carrying out these policies
and programs, regardless of an employee's "rank," as long as that
discretion was of "the nature and quality that Congress intended to
shield from tort liability." 25 Specifically, the Court pointed out that
the exception was designed to "encompass discretionary acts of
Government acting in its role as a regulator of conduct of private
individuals. ' 26 According to the Court, the exception was intended
to prevent judicial intrusion into agency decisions grounded in eco-
nomic, social, and political policy. 27 As applied, the Court held that
the "spot-checking" program implemented by the FAA for aircraft
certification was a discretionary decision grounded in such policy
and could not be attacked by a tort action.28 In addition, although
the Court failed to clarify whether or not it was applying the plan-
ning/operational distinction, the Court focused its decision on the
FAA's designation as an agency for the certification of aircraft. The
FAA's choice of methods for such certification is clearly a planning
level decision.29
21 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
22 Id at 800-01. The plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was negligent in failing to de-
tect a faulty lavatory trash receptacle and in allowing a gasoline-burning heater that did
not comply with FAA regulations to be installed in an airplane.
23 Id. at 811-12 (concluding that Dalehite is "a valid interpretation of the discretion-
ary function exception").
24 Id. at 813. •
25 Id.
26 Id. at 813-14.
27 Id. at 819-20.
28 Id.
29 Id. ("The FAA's implementation of a mechanism for compliance review is plainly
discretionary activity" and, using this discretion, "the FAA has determined that aprogram
of 'spot-checking' manufacturers' compliance with minimum safety standards best ac-
commodates the goal of air transportation safety.") (emphasis added).
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The Court appeared to step back from Varig Airlines four years
later in Berkovitz v. United States.30 In this case, the parents of a minor
who contracted polio after taking an oral polio vaccine brought an
action against the government for approving and distributing a
faulty batch of the vaccine. In deciding that the discretionary func-
tion exception did not protect the government's action, the Court
established a two-part test for determining the applicability of the
exception: first, the government conduct must involve an element
of choice, and second, the discretionary function exception "pro-
tects only governmental actions and decisions based on considera-
tions of public policy." 3 1 These public policy considerations, as the
Varig Court had articulated, were those agency considerations
grounded in social, economic, or political policy. 32
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Berkovitz reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the tort action and found that the government
could be liable. Mandatory regulations guided the FDA's conduct
and required the receipt of safety data on the drug, examination of
the product, and a determination that it complied with all safety
standards.33 Because the FDA failed to take these steps, its conduct
was not discretionary and therefore not protected from liability by
the discretionary function exception.
Although Berkovitz narrowed the applicability of the exception
from the simple requirement in Vaig Airlines of some level of discre-
30 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
31 Id. at 537-39.
32 Id. at 537 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814). The exact definition of what is
or is not an economic, social, or political consideration is not clear from any of the
Court's decisions other than case by case determinations of what discretionary action
falls within these considerations. Some guidance is provided, however, as to the polar
ends of this definition in the Varig Court's citation to the legislative history behind the
discretionary function exception. The Court quotes:
It is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legisla-
tion, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary admin-
istrative act should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for
tort. The same holds true of other administrative action not of a regula-
tory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execution of a
Federal project, and the like.
On the other hand, the common law torts of employees of regulatory
agencies, as well as of all other Federal agencies, would be included
within the scope of the bill [FTCA].
VarigAirlines, 467 U.S. at 809-10 (quoting Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 33
(1942)). What discretionary action between these two ends is considered based in eco-
nomic, social, or political considerations has evidently been left to judicial determina-
tion. See Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The contours of
the discretionary function cannot be defined with precision. Thus, each case must be
analyzed individually based upon relevant criteria in determining whether the acts of
government employees are protected from liability.").
33 486 U.S. at 546-47.
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tion, the holding continued the focus on the nature of the conduct
rather than on the status of the actor.34 In other words, if a low-
level government employee is granted discretion in his or her con-
duct, and that discretion involves considerations of economic, so-
cial, or political policy, action resulting from that discretion would
be within the exception and immune from tort liability under the
FTCA.
Although Berkovitz laid down a fairly clear test for applying the
exception, the Court continued to leave some areas of the excep-
tion's applicability clouded in dictum. As in Varig Airlines, the Court
failed to clarify whether the planning/operational level distinction
still existed. 35 The Court did state that if an agency's policies or
programs "allow" room for lower-level officials to make independ-
ent policy judgments, the exception would protect those decisions
and conduct.8 6 The Court failed to clarify, however, either when a
program or policy "allows" independent judgment or whether the
word "official" established a threshold test for who may not claim
the exception. Despite this confusion, Berkovitz requires that, to be
protected by the exception, the challenged discretion must involve
public policy considerations.37
II
APPLYING THE CASE LAW TO GOVERNMENTAL FAILURE TO
WARN OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
A. Similar Applications, Different Results
Two recent cases show how courts have reached different re-
sults when applying the discretionary function exception to a gov-
ernmental failure to warn citizens of detected environmental
34 Id. at 536. The status of the actor had become an important element of the plan-
ning/operational distinction following the Court's decision in Indian Towing. In that
case, the acts of Coast Guard personnel in failing to check the lighthouse battery and
sun relay system and in failing to inspect the facility adequately on the day of the inci-
dent were questions of "operational level" negligence. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 62, 64.
35 Arguably, the Court's "nature of the conduct" test maintains an inherent plan-
ning/operational distinction. In fact, this distinction would provide a simple initial test
of the nature of the conduct involved. See infra note 124 (justice Scalia's concurrence in
United States v. Guabert, 111 S. Ct. 1269 (1991)).
36 486 U.S. at 546.
37 DAvis, supra note 5, § 27:12 (Supp. 1989) ("The term 'discretionary function'
that is commonly used might well be changed to 'policy choice' in order to comply with
the Court's holding in the Berkovitz case.... Making bad policy is not a tort.").
The Supreme Court recently addressed the discretionary function exception again
in Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1267. Although this case is logically relevant to a current under-
standing of the exception, it will be discussed in detail later in this Note because of its
particular impact on the planning/operational distinction and because of its possible
limitation to federal banking regulation practices. See infra notes 120-24 and accompa-
nying text.
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hazards. In Lockett v. United States,38 the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal of suit brought by neighbors of a scrap
reclamation operation against the EPA for failure to warn of danger-
ous levels of PCBs 39 on and around the site. The EPA had known
for eight years that the level of PCBs exceeded safe levels. In 1981,
a state inspector, acting on behalf of the EPA, visited the Carter In-
dustrial, Inc. scrap reclamation site to test PCB levels on the prop-
erty. The inspector found PCBs at a level of 560 ppm, over ten
times the accepted level,40 in an oil puddle on the property. 4 1 After
being notified of these results, the EPA concluded that there was
insufficient evidence of contamination of the site and took no ac-
tion.42 In 1984 the Carter site was tested again for PCB contamina-
tion. The results showed a range of contamination on and around
the site including levels of 31 and 167 ppm from ground surround-
ing old transformers, 131 ppm from the main driveway of the prop-
erty, and 2,340 ppm-almost 47 times the accepted level established
by the EPA-taken from an alley just off the property.43 A local EPA
project officer was notified of these findings, but again the EPA de-
cided the evidence of contamination was insufficient to take any ac-
tion upon the site.44 Instead, the EPA ordered only further
monitoring of the site. In 1986, the site was again tested, this time
revealing PCB levels as high as 90,000 ppm. The EPA finally took
action, ordering an emergency cleanup and issuing advisory notices
to the local media and the residents of the area surrounding the
Carter site.45
The plaintiffs filed suit in 1988, claiming that the EPA had neg-
ligently failed to warn them of the detected levels of PCBs on the
Carter site and had "fail[ed] to exercise reasonable care to prevent
or at least decrease the risks from continued exposure to PCBs" af-
ter the 1981 test of the site.46 The government moved for summary
judgment, claiming that it was shielded from liability by the discre-
tionary function exception. The district court, finding the exception
applicable, granted the government's motion. According to the dis-
trict court, the EPA's conduct was a matter of choice and involved
38 938 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1991).
39 Polychlorinated biphenyls. Congress and the EPA have set aside PCBs as a spe-
cific toxic substance deserving special attention. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1977); 40
C.F.R. § 761 (1990).
40 Fifty ppm is the regulated level of PCBs established by the EPA. 40 C.F.R.
§ 761.20 (1990).
41 Lockett, 938 F.2d at 631.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 631-32.
46 Id. at 632.
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political, economic, or social policy considerations. 47 Therefore,
under Berkovitz, the EPA's decision not to warn was the type of dis-
cretion that the exception protected.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the summary judgment and
agreed with the district court's reasoning. Specifically, the court of
appeals rejected the petitioner's argument that the EPA had a
mandatory duty after detecting a PCB hazard to warn potentially
affected parties.48 The court claimed that the relevant statutory and
regulatory scheme involving PCB hazards granted the EPA discre-
tion, providing the EPA with a range of action following the detec-
tion of an environmental hazard.49 Specifically, the court found this
discretion in a portion of the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA),
which governs the use of PCBs, and which instructs the EPA admin-
istrator to consider "the environmental, economic, and social im-
pact" of action taken under the Act.50 The court then held that,
since the EPA had discretion in its response to the tests at the Carter
site, the EPA's response was the type of discretion the exception
intended to protect. Accepting the EPA's contention that its deci-
sion merely to continue monitoring the site between 1984 and 1986
was primarily based on a desire to concentrate on the inspection of
47 Id. (asserting that these EPA "administrative determinations are grounded in so-
cial, economic and political policy and are thus the type of decisions the discretionary
function exception is designed to protect").
48 Id. at 638-39. The plaintiffs based their claim of mandatory duty on statutory
and regulatory language: 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988) (requiring the Administrator to
promulgate rules controlling the manufacturing, use, and disposal of PCBs); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973(c) (1988) (requiring the Administrator to give public notice upon information of
a imminent and substantial endangerment involving hazardous waste); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 761.1-761.218 (1990) (regulations governing the manufacture, use, and disposal of
PCBs); 52 Fed. Reg. 10,688 (1987) (Preamble to Polychlorinated Biphenyls Spill
Cleanup Policy); 47 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1982) (requiring the initiation of PCB Trans-
former spill cleanup within 48 hours of spill discovery).
49 Id. at 637.
50 Id. at 634 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1976)). That this statutory statement
implies agency discretion throughout TSCA action is somewhat superficial. Certainly
those sections of TSCA which state that the Administrator "shall" perform some action
do not leave room for agency discretion. For example, see 15 U.S.C. § 2603(d) (1976),
which states that the Administrator shall publish a notice of receipt of test data pursuant
to establishing a priority list of substances to be controlled under TSCA. See also infra
note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the word "shall" and its accepted
mandatory implications).
The Lockett court also pointed to the use of the word "may" as implying discretion
in EPA control of toxic substances in the "Imminent Hazard" section of TSCA. 938
F.2d at 634-45 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1976)). In the court's opinion, the EPA had
discretion whether to bring a civil action in the event of a imminent hazard detection
and in determining what should be included in the relief sought, including the possibil-
ity of public notice of the risk. Id. This seems to be an uneven reading of the statute.
Although the EPA is granted discretion in deciding to bring a civil action, the district
court hearing the claim is allowed the discretion in determining what type of relief will
be granted. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(b)(1), (2) (1976).
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waste-oil haulers within the state, the court held that the EPA's
judgment was grounded in public policy and therefore the excep-
tion shielded the EPA from liability.51
Dissenting, Judge Edwards disagreed with the court's holding
that notifying the public of the hazard was a matter of choice for the
EPA. He cited several regulations that he believed required the
EPA to act in a specific manner upon notice of dangerous levels of
PCBs. Judge Edwards accepted the regulatory evidence the plain-
tiffs submitted on the summary judgment motion showing that it
was improper for the court to assume the EPA's actions were a mat-
ter of choice.52 In addition, he emphasized additional regulatory
language stating that the EPA "will seek stringent penalties in any
situation in which significant dispersion of PCBs occurs due to a vio-
lation."53 Judge Edwards further stated that even if the government
does have discretion to warn the public, the type of discretion the
EPA exercised was not grounded in political, economic, or social
policy, as required by Berkovitz, and therefore was not protected by
the exception. 54 In sum, Judge Edwards believed that the EPA had
failed to introduce sufficient evidence that public policy considera-
tions justified its failure to warn.55
A similar factual situation led to a different result in Dube v.
Pittsburgh Corning.56 In Dube, the daughter of a Navy shipyard worker
contracted mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos fibers car-
ried home on her father's work clothes. The defendant, an asbestos
manufacturer, settled the claim and sought damage contributions
from the U.S. government for failing to warn the workers and their
families of the asbestos hazards in the work environment. Despite
the district court's finding that the government had ascertained the
risk and negligently failed to warn the workers and their families of
the asbestos dangers, and that its negligence proximately caused the
daughter's injury, the district court nonetheless held the govern-
ment immune from liability under the discretionary function
exception.
51 Id. at 638-39.
52 Id. at 639-41.
53 Id. at 641 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 31,538 (1979)).
54 Id. at 640-41.
55 According to Judge Edwards,
[t]he EPA has not brought forth any of the documents that are ordinarily
produced in the course of public policy decisions to explain the agency's
failure to prosecute Carter Industrials in 1981. It has produced no notes
of policy meetings, no reports, no memorandums, no affidavits, no depo-
sitions: not an iota of information on who made the decision or why.
Id. at 640.
56 870 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1989).
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On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court, finding
that the discretionary function exception did not protect the govern-
ment's failure to warn the families. While rejecting the appellants'
argument that naval regulations mandated a governmental duty to
warn the workers and their families, the court held that the govern-
ment had negligently failed to warn of the danger. The discretion-
ary function exception did not protect this negligent discretion.57
According to the First Circuit, the discretionary function excep-
tion is a narrow exception applicable only to actual decisions based
on public policy. Such a decision did not exist in Dube since the
government had never explicitly decided to forgo warning the work-
ers and their families. The government had simply failed to do so.58
The court concluded that "it is difficult to imagine the Navy justify-
ing a decision not to issue a simple warning to domestic bystanders
of such potentially devastating danger, based on economic or other
policy grounds." 59
These two cases illustrate the confusing and ambiguous line
plaintiffs must walk when seeking to hold the government liable for
failing to warn of environmental hazards. Both cases appear to
present situations in which the government negligently failed to
warn affected parties, an action not clearly based upon any policy
issue. Both cases, however, reached different results through simi-
lar application of the discretionary function exception.
B. Lockett is the Rule, Not the Exception
Despite the differing views of the discretionary function excep-
tion expressed in Lockett and Dube, most recent cases have agreed
with Lockett and held that the EPA's failure to warn of an ascertained
environmental hazard falls within the discretionary function excep-
tion and therefore shielded from tort liability. Some of these cases
involve remarkably broad deference to EPA action and decision at
virtually any level without any clear explanation for such deference.
For example, in Wells v. United States,60 the D.C. Circuit dismissed an
action against the EPA for failing to warn residents about high levels
of lead contamination found in neighborhoods surrounding lead
smelters. The court held that such a failure was grounded in public
57 Id. at 799-800.
58 Id. at 796.
59 Id. at 799. While a similar argument would appear to apply to the EPA's failure
to warn in Lockett, the Dube court was careful to point out that similar failures to warn by
the EPA are within the exception, calling these "areas of activity where the government
is under no affirmative duty to act in the first instance." Id. at 798. The reasons for
treating the situations differently are not clear from the court's opinion.
60 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
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policy and could not be attacked in a tort action.61 Because the
plaintiffs' complaint attacked the EPA's lack of immediate action, the
court focused mainly on the economic and social evidence the gov-
ernment presented in support of its decision not to take such ac-
tion.62 This allowed the court to uphold the dismissal of the action
without dealing squarely with the EPA's failure to warn the residents
of the hazard.
The Eighth Circuit reached the same result in Bacon v. United
States.63 The court excused the EPA from liability for failing to warn
of a known environmental hazard, high dioxin levels, that affected
road workers repairing roadways. The Eighth Circuit held that be-
cause the EPA had not adopted a policy requiring a warning of po-
tential dioxin danger, similar to the FDA policies requiring
mandatory action in Berkovitz, 64 its failure to warn was discretionary
and therefore protected by the exception. 65
In Cisco v. United States,66 a case preceding Berkovitz, the Seventh
Circuit also claimed that the EPA had broad discretion, showing
great deference to the EPA even though it made no decision at all.
The court claimed that "Congress has left to the EPA to decide the
manner in which, and the extent to which, it will protect individuals
and their property from exposure to hazardous wastes."'67 The
court offered no support for this declaration other than pointing to
the absence of a Congressionally imposed mandatory requirement
for the EPA to warn of environmental dangers. This logic is faulty,
as is the Bacon court's search for a mandatory duty to warn, given
the more recent Supreme Court treatment of the exception in
Berkovitz. The Court stated that the discretionary function exception
did not protect all discretion.68 Only when choice is allowed and
the decisions are grounded in economic, social, or political concerns
will the action receive protection from liability.69
61 Id. at 1476-77.
62 Id. at 1477-78.
63 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987).
64 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing Berkovitz).
65 Id. at 830 (stating that no "safety policy requiring warnings" had been adopted).
66 768 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1985).
67 Id. at 789.
68 486 U.S. 531, 537-39 (1988).
69 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing Berkovitz).
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III
REMOVING THE FAILURE TO WARN OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
These examples of how courts treat the failure to warn of an
environmental hazard, while arguably consistent, ignore the proper
characterization of the action under attack and, in some cases, fail to
recognize both the statutorily mandated duties of the EPA as well as
the general function of the agency. More recent cases have explic-
itly or implicitly ignored any distinction between planning level and
operational level discretion, believing the distinction is no longer
good law after Varig Airlines and Berkovitz.70 Reevaluating the impli-
cations of governmental failure to warn of known environmental
hazards shows that these tort actions should not be easily dismissed
as unactionable under the discretionary function exception.
A. The Duty to Warn of Environmental Hazards as Mandatory
for the EPA
Several arguments support the mandatory nature of the EPA's
duty to warn of environmental hazards it has properly detected. 7 1
First, the EPA's enabling statute and its relation to the general pub-
lic demonstrate that such a duty is concomitant with the EPA's pur-
pose.72 For example, although the explanations of the role and
70 For a discussion of the Court's most recent treatment of this distinction, see infra
notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
71 Deciding when a hazard is properly detected would seem to follow from the
EPA's own guidelines concerning the levels at which waste becomes hazardous to public
health and the environment. See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985) (claiming that once regulations require the Army,
Corps of Engineers to regulate dredged or fill material, it must make reasoned wetlands
determinations); State of Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating
that the EPA was under a statutory and self-imposed duty by the terms of its regulations
to deal with regional haze and "[w]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incum-
bent upon agencies to follow their own procedures").
For example, the EPA considers PCB concentrations greater than 50 ppm to "pre-
sent an unreasonable risk of injury to health within the United States." 40 C.F.R.
§ 761.20 (1990). It would follow from this regulation that any PCB concentration de-
tected above 50 ppm is an environmental hazard. Proper detection may also follow from
the reporting requirement of PCB leaks or spills and the requirement of cleanup by the
responsible party within 48 hours. 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 (1990). A notification from haz-
ardous waste manufacturers or handlers to the EPA of such a spill or cleanup efforts
would also be classified as proper detection of an environmental hazard.
72 For examples of courts looking to agency enabling or organic statutes to deter-
mine agency duties, see Azurin v. Von Raab, 803 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The
starting point in determining the scope of [United States Customs Service's] duty lies in
examining the language of the agency's enabling statutes."), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021
(1987); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating
that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the organic statute for the Bureau of
Land Management, imposes on the agency a general duty "to plan for and manage fed-
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function of the EPA set out in its enabling statute are ambiguous, a
clear tone of protection pervades the statute.73 The enabling stat-
ute refers to the "great importance" of "arresting environmental
deterioration... [of] the quality of life in our country ... ."74 The
first function of the EPA, the statute declares, is to provide "en-
forcement of environmental protection standards consistent with
national environmental goals."75 Additional evidence of the impor-
tance of protection as a central purpose of the EPA is found in the
declaration of the primary purpose of the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA).76 Congress enacted TSCA to "assure that ... such
chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.. ." and to provide au-
thority "to take action with respect to chemical substances and mix-
tures which are imminent hazards."' 77
eral land and resources"); Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272-73 (8th Cir.
1980) (stating that any action taken by a federal agency must fall within the agency's
appropriate province under its organic statute), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); United
States v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that duties and powers of
Customs Service are limited to the type described in enabling statute), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 823 (1970); Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987) (looking to the en-
abling statute of the Public Health Council to determine if the Council acted within its
power in prohibiting smoking in public areas). But see Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 872 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that agency con-
struction of enabling legislation is accorded considerable deference and will be followed
if reasonably defensible).
73 See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1343 (1988). The enabling statute declares that the EPA was created "to assure the
protection of the environment by abating and controlling pollution on a systematic ba-
sis." Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1989) (reciting this same language as a purpose of the
EPA). The knowledge gained through the agency is to "ensure the protection, develop-
ment and enhancement of the total environment itself." 5 U.S.C. app. at 1345 (1988).
While not pointing to any specific duty of the EPA, it is clear that the underlying pur-
pose of the agency is protection.
74 5 U.S.C. app. at 1347 (1988) ("Advantages of Reorganization" section).
75 Id. ("Roles and Functions of EPA" section). What these national goals include is
unclear from the statute, but the underlying purpose of protection is again expressed by
this statement. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1985) ("The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency permits coordinated and effective governmental action to assure the protection
of the environment by abating and controlling pollution on a systematic basis."). These
statements express a notion of limiting the amount of protection provided based on
costs. While this is a concern of any governmental agency, the act of providing a warn-
ing of known environmental hazards involves only minimal costs and a failure to warn
cannot logically be claimed to be the result of resource problems. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text; Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1986)
(noting a lower court's discussion of the minimal costs of warning labels for asbestos
products); Morgan v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975) (noting that balancing
the minimal cost of warning to manufacturers against the benefit of a warning almost
always weighs in favor of warning).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
77 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), (3) (1988).
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Critics may charge that these examples are too vague to impose
any duty on the EPA to warn the public.78 When considering the
nature of the hazards over which the EPA has responsibility, how-
ever, the necessity for public warning becomes clear.79 The EPA,
especially in its control of toxic substances like PCBs, deals with
substantial hazards that cannot be detected, in almost all cases, by
the senses or intellect of the average individual.80 The agency was
specifically organized to fill this gap and to act as the environmental
hazard "sensor" for the general public.81 If that "sensor" has no
duty to warn those it was designed to protect, little incentive exists
for it to perform one of its main purposes-protecting those who
are unable to protect themselves.8 2 As the Dube court asserted in
78 But see George F. Indest, III, Note, Legal Aspects of HCFA 's Decision to Allow Recovery
From Children for Medicaid Benefits Delivered to Their Parents Through State Financial Responsibil-
ity Statutes: A Case of Bad Rule Making Through Failure to Comply with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 15 S.U. L. REv. 225, 258-59 (1988) ("Where a federal agency pursues a course
of action directly contrary to a statute which sets forth its purpose and duties, the acts of
that agency have exceeded the scope of its authority, and are ultra vires and invalid.").
79 Consider the EPA's own discussion of the PCB hazards:
1. Health Effects
EPA has determined that PCBs are toxic and persistent. PCBs can
enter the body through the lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and skin, circu-
late through the body, and be stored in the fatty tissue. Available animal
studies indicate an oncogenic potential, the degree of which would de-
pend on exposure.... In addition, EPA finds that PCBs may cause re-
productive effects, developmental toxicity, and oncogenicity in humans
exposed to PCBs .... In some cases, chloracne may occur in humans
exposed to PCBs. [Severe] cases of chloracne are painful, disfiguring,
and may require a long time before the symptoms disappear...
2. Environmental Effects
... EPA has concluded that PCBs can be concentrated in freshwater
and marine organisms. The transfer of PCBs up the food chain from phy-
toplankton to invertebrates, fish, and mammals can result ultimately in
human exposure .... PCBs also are toxic to fish at very low exposure
levels ....
Minimizing exposure to PCBs should minimize any potential risk.
49 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1984). PCBs obviously present significant dangers to both human
health and the environment, making a public warning of any dangerous concentrations
necessary to avoid these dangers.
80 PCB contamination cannot be detected by sight, taste, or smell in almost all
cases. The EPA recognized this unique danger by formulating specific regulations for
the control and prohibition of PCB production. See 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1990).
81 See 5 U.S.C. app. at 1346 (1988) ("Advantages of Reorganization" section).
The EPA would have the capacity to do research on important pollutants
irrespective of the media in which they appear, and on the impact of these
pollutants on the total environment. Both by itself and together with
other agencies, the EPA would monitor the condition of the environ-
ment-biological as well as physical.
Id.
82 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. No incentive exists to protect the
public from environmental hazards if the agency is not forced to internalize the costs of
failing to protect, for example, by failing to warn. See Krent, supra note 5, at 885 (argu-
ing that the government would minimize prevention and accident costs "if forced to
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holding the government liable for failing to warn of asbestos
hazards, it is difficult to imagine the government "justifying a deci-
sion not to issue a simple warning to domestic bystanders of such
potentially devastating danger, based on economic or other policy
grounds." 83 This statement applies to the severe hazards certain
substances, such as PCBs, pose for the public, substances which the
EPA has been directed to control. A "simple warning" involves
minimal costs yet could prevent substantial harm to the population
and the environment as a whole.8 4
A useful analogy in this context can be generally based on the
facts of VaigAirlines.8 5 Suppose the FAA actually inspected the air-
craft in question, detected that the design was indeed faulty, and
knew that it presented a substantial hazard to anyone operating or
traveling on the aircraft-but then failed to warn any likely affected
parties such as passengers, pilots, or mechanics. If the aircraft sub-
sequently crashes, resulting in injury or death, it is unlikely that a
court with full knowledge of these facts would excuse the FAA's fail-
ure to warn as being within the discretionary function exception. 6
The FAA's failure is clearly negligent and detracts from a basic un-
derstanding of the FAA's purpose: to ensure the safe operation of
the nation's aircraft services.8 7
Although this scenario may seem somewhat unlikely, it closely
parallels the EPA's action-or lack thereof-in Lockett. The EPA in-
spected the Carter site, detected an environmental hazard, and
knew it presented a substantial hazard to possible affected parties.88
To allow the EPA to escape liability through the discretionary func-
tion exception for failing to warn of ascertained environmental
hazards is to detract from the agency's underlying purpose of pro-
tecting the general public from such hazards.8 9
internalize the costs of its actions."); see also infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text
(discussing the need for an incentive to ensure reasonable agency action).
83 Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1989).
84 See supra note 75 (discussing minimal cost of warning).
85 See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
86 In fact, the Court in Varig Airlines specifically distinguished such a situation not-
ing that there was no indication that the trash receptacle or cabin heater had been actu-
ally inspected. 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
87 See 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a), (c) (1988) (FAA administrator is to prescribe air traffic
rules and regulations for the protection of aircraft, persons, and property and to gener-
ally insure the safety of aircraft).
88 A PCB level almost 50 times above acceptable levels was detected just off the
Carter site. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
89 In response to this dichotomy, the EPA might point to perceived differences be-
tween the two governmental failures to warn. The EPA might express concern over the
economic impact upon an industry or individual from the public warning of the environ-
mental hazard. This concern exists in the FAA situation as well, however, since any
public warning of faulty aircraft design is likely to economically impact both the airline
and the manufacturer. A court would be unlikely to accept such a defense by the FAA.
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The mandatory nature of this duty to warn of environmental
hazards can also be based on specific sections of federal statutes and
EPA regulations. For example, in adopting its specific treatment of
PCBs, the EPA states that the agency "will seek stringent penalties
in any situation in which significant dispersion of PCBs occurs due
to a violation." 90 This statement appears to require some EPA ac-
tion when a PCB hazard is detected. 91 Stronger evidence of a
mandatory duty to warn is found in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).92 Under the heading of "Imminent Hazard,"
Congress proclaimed:
Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at
any site which has presented an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to human health or the environment, the [EPA] Adminis-
trator shall provide immediate notice to the appropriate local
government agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall require
notice of such endangerment to be promptly posted at the site
where the waste is located.93
The primary purpose of both agencies is to protect the public. Economic considerations
should not easily overcome this purpose when clear violations of established regulations
exist.
Next, the EPA may contend that the information required to determine an environ-
mental hazard is more scientific, requiring greater deliberation or evidence than an FAA
determination of aircraft safety. This argument would also seem to fail given that the
EPA sets the -levels at which waste or pollution becomes hazardous and must only deter-
mine if these levels have been violated to determine the existence of a hazard. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
The EPA may also point to the possible unforeseeability of danger inherent in some
environmental hazards. Certainly those instances occur. The focus of this Note, how-
ever, is on situations such as Lockett in which the danger presented by the hazard is dear,
given the level of toxicity detected.
Finally, the EPA might argue that an FAA failure to warn creates a more immediate
danger to the public in the form of a major accident. This argument loses its force,
however, when reconsidering the EPA's own explanation of the "immediate" dangers
presented by such substances as PCBs. See supra note 79.
90 44 Fed. Reg. § 31,538 (1979) (emphasis added). Given the EPA's own discus-
sion of the dangers of PCB contamination and its choice in establishing the regulated
level at 50 ppm, a "significant dispersion" should be defined, for the purpose of warning
the public, when contamination is detected above this level. See supra note 79 (discuss-
ing the dangers of PCB hazards).
91 No court other than the Sixth Circuit in Lockett has apparently addressed this
EPA regulation in the context of a FTCA action against the agency. Even in Lockett, it
was the dissent, not the majority or the plaintiffs, that recognized the mandatory nature
of this language in describing the regulation of PCB hazards by the EPA. 938 F.2d 630,
641 (6th Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
93 42 U.S.C. § 6973(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Given the EPA's concern over
PCB hazards, the Lockett situation would appear to be an "imminent hazard," since the
EPA detected PCB levels almost 50 times higher than the regulated level. See supra note
42 and accompanying text.
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The use of the word "shall" eliminates any notion of discretion and
establishes a requirement of public warning.94 Consequently, the
statute hinges on the interpretation of "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to effectuate this mandatory duty to warn. Most
courts interpret this phrase broadly to allow EPA action when no
clear emergency or actual proof of harm exists. 95 This same inter-
pretation would logically apply to instances when the EPA's duty to
warn is triggered. 96 Other statutes and regulations, while not as
clear as these two examples, also provide evidence of a mandatory
duty of the EPA to warn of significant environmental hazards.97
This argument, then, removes the EPA's failure to warn of environ-
mental hazards from the protection of the discretionary function ex-
ception by demonstrating a mandatory duty to warn.98
94 For examples ofjudicial recognition of "shall" as implying mandatory action, see
Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 562 (1989) (noting use of the
mandatory term "shall"); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (stating that use of
the word "shall" imposes a duty on Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to act);
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947) (noting that "shall" is ordinarily the lan-
guage of command, implying mandatory action); Duncan v. Rolm Mil-Spec Computers,
917 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that "shall" should be given mandatory mean-
ing unless doing so clearly frustrates legislative intent).
95 United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding 42
U.S.C. § 6973 is not specifically limited to emergency situations); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that "Imminent Haz-
ard" is not limited to a concept of crisis; a substantial likelihood that serious harm will
be experienced is enough); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.
N.H. 1985) (finding that endangerment posed by toxic wastes is a threatened or poten-
tial harm; proof of actual harm is not required).
96 The Lockett court recognized this warning requirement but summarily dismissed
it as implying no duty on the EPA to warn the neighbors of the Carter site because it was
only applicable if the EPA determined that an imminent hazard existed. 938 F.2d at 630
n.7. This treatment of the statute not only avoids the question but also creates a circular
arrangement by which the EPA controls the effectuation of a statutory duty. If the EPA
wants to avoid the "burden" of providing a simple warning to likely affected parties of
an environmental hazard, by the court's reasoning, the agency will simply avoid classify-
ing the hazard as imminent or dangerous. This defeats the purpose of a mandatory duty
to warn "[u]pon receipt of information" that an imminent hazard exists. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973(c) (1988).
At the same time, allowing the EPA to interpret "imminent hazard" broadly when
the agency seeks to bring civil actions, see supra note 95, and then narrowly when faced
with a duty to warn, is both illogical and unreasonable. See Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc. v.
McHenry, 607 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Ark. 1980) (agreeing with the idea that if citizens "must
turn square corners when they deal with the government" it is difficult to understand
why the government "should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude
when dealing with its citizens").
97 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988) (expressing congressional concern for
the significant health and environmental dangers associated with PCBs); 47 Fed. Reg.
37,342 (1982) (stating that the EPA requires the initiation of clean up of PCB spills or
leaks within 48 hours of discovery).
98 The Lockett court also addressed the regulation requiring clean up of a PCB spill
or leak within 48 hours. The court stated the regulation in terms that implied the duty
to clean up in this time frame only fell on the land owner of the spill location. 938 F.2d
at 636. This may be a reasonable reading of the regulation, but it fails to address the
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B. The Duty to Warn of Environmental Hazards is Not Based
on Public Policy Considerations
Even if the underlying purpose of the EPA and specific rules
and regulations governing it do not impose a mandatory duty on the
agency to warn of known hazards, the agency's failure to issue a
public warning still must be recognized as a certain type of discre-
tionary act or function in order to fall within the discretionary func-
tion exception.99 This requires the discretion to be grounded in
economic, political, or social considerations. 10 0 When applied to
the EPA, such considerations properly allow agency discretion in
several circumstances: the establishment of standards for emissions
or toxic substance levels;' 0 ' the choice of what action or what rem-
edy the agency will seek against the violator; 10 2 and the establish-
ment of methods and timing for cleanup of discovered
environmental hazards or accidents. 03 These types of decisions,
whether made by the Administrator or lower level officials, require a
balancing of economic, social, and political concerns with the con-
cern for environmental protection.'0 4 For the agency to function
properly, these decisions must be left to agency discretion in order
to benefit from expertise within the EPA. Discretion in these in-
stances prevents the inhibiting effect of private tort action or the
fear of such action. The discretionary function exception is un-
question of the EPA's duty to warn of such a hazard. Also, the court seemed to base its
determination that no duty to warn existed, at least in part, by pointing to the EPA's own
view that its enforcement obligations toward PCB hazards were discretionary. Id. The
EPA's view, however, seems irrelevant given the issue before the court. See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text.
Few other courts have addressed specific regulations or statutes when confronted
with the question of whether the EPA has a duty to warn of known environmental
hazards. The court in Cisco v. United States, for example, while dealing specifically with
SWCA/RCRA sections, eliminated any possible mandatory duty to warn under the stat-
ute through its broad deference to EPA decisions. 768 F.2d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); see
supra note 67 and accompanying text. Also, the Cisco court failed to recognize the exis-
tence of the "imminent hazard" section of SWCA as a possible source of a duty to warn.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
99 See generally United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116,
121 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[R]egulatory conduct is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
application of the discretionary function exception. Not all regulatory acts are discre-
tionary."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988).
100 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Berkovitz Court's rec-
ognition of this requirement).
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988) (stating that the EPA, based on agency research, is to
make determinations of what substances present an unreasonable risk to public health).
102 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2610, 2615-2616 (1988) (relating to subpoenas, civil and crimi-
nal penalties, and seizure).
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988) (imminent hazards).
104 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1988) (stating that congressional intent is to have adminis-
trators consider economic, environmental, and social impact of actions).
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doubtedly effective and necessary in these particular areas of agency
discretion.
A failure to warn likely affected parties of known environmental
dangers, however, is a more difficult decision or nondecision to ana-
lyze as based on "economic, social, or political concerns."10 5 An
agency warning to those individuals likely affected by a known envi-
ronmental hazard, even if no further EPA action is immediately
taken, allows those individuals, at the very least, to take protective
measures for themselves.' 0 6 Making such a warning only involves
considerations of the health and safety of the population. 10 7
Many courts have stated that an agency's failure to warn of a
hazard is a safety consideration and not one based on economic,
political, or social policy decisions. In Summers v. United States,108 the
Ninth Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not
protect the National Park Service's (NPS) failure to warn the public
about the potential dangers of hot coals when the NPS allowed fire
rings on a beach. The court stated that the NPS's failure to warn
departed from safety considerations inherent in the service's poli-
cies and did not represent ajudgment based on economic, social, or
political factors. 10 9 In a broader statement, the court also asserted
that the discretionary function exception does not cover the failure
105 See Stilo, supra note 5, at 612 (noting that some courts have stated that a onetime
warning by an agency presents no serious administrative or financial burden).
106 Id. (arguing that a warning at least allows individuals to protect themselves). In-
dividual measures might include purifying the water supply, avoiding the contaminated
area, or relocating temporarily.
To allow individuals to take these measures, the warning provided must be informa-
tional to some extent. In some situations, the information necessary to provide an ade-
quate notice to the public may justify a brief delay between the EPA's initial knowledge
of an environmental hazard and the issuance of a warning. In the majority of cases,
however, the EPA is sufficiently familiar with the hazard detected and the dangers it
presents to the public to issue an adequate warning soon after the initial detection of the
hazard. See also infra note 117 (discussing the EPA's fear of public over-reaction to a
warning).
107 This characteristic of public warnings also defeats any agency counter-argument
concerning the scarcity of government resources. Separated from any other EPA action,
public warnings require minimal economic resources and manpower. All that is neces-
sary in almost all environmental cases is notice to the proper legal authorities, posted
warnings on the contaminated site, or individual warnings to a small, localized
population.
108 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990).
109 Id. at 1216; see alsoJohnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 339 (10th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing between discretionary function exception cases involving program judg-
ments based in economic, social, or political judgments in which the exception applies,
and those cases involving failures to warn of hazardous conditions based on safety con-
siderations in which the exception is not applicable).
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to warn of a hazard simply because a discretionary function is in
some way involved.' 10
In Boyd v. United States,11' the court held that a failure to warn
was a safety rather than an economic, social, or political question.
In Boyd, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of government
liability when the Army Corps of Engineers failed to warn swimmers
of dangerous conditions which resulted in the plaintiff's injury. The
court held that while the decision not to zone an area for swimming
was discretionary, the failure to warn of the dangerous conditions
"d[id] not implicate any social, economic, or political policy judg-
ments with which the discretionary function exception [was] prop-
erly . . .concerned." 2 These cases show that a failure to warn
primarily involves safety considerations and does not involve the
type of discretion that the discretionary function exception was in-
tended to protect."13
The government in Lockett, however, avoided liability under the
protection of the discretionary function exception by stating that it
took no further action on the Carter site because it believed that the
waste-oil haulers, problem deserved immediate attention. 1 4 Per-
1Ho 905 F.2d at 1214; see also Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir.
1986) (finding failure to warn boaters of low power lines under government control
involved safety considerations of established policies and was not protected by the dis-
cretionary function exception).
111 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
112 Id. at 898; see also Seyler v. United States, 832 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1987) (failure to
erect speed warning signs was not grounded in economic, social, or political considera-
tions); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1986) (failure to warn of swim-
ming hazards in national park was a failure of park service personnel to comply with
safety policy and not a decision based on economic, political, or social concerns).
113 But see Stilo, supra note 5, at 608-09 (stating that the "failure to warn theory is not
likely to prove any more viable an option than it had been before Berkovitz" and citing
cases that have held the failure to warn resulted from a decision based on economic,
social, or political considerations). Stilo specifically cites Wells v. United States, 851
F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989), for this proposition. In
that case, the court held that the EPA's failure to warn of the health risks created by lead
pollution was an exercise of policy discretion and protected by the discretionary func-
tion exception. Id. at 1476-77. The Wells case, however, presents a very different situa-
tion than Lockett. In Wells, the questioned action was an EPA Deputy Administrator's
decision to continue studying the effects of lead pollution to establish the appropriate-
ness of a 1000 ppm standard. This action clearly required the Deputy Administrator to
balance economic, social, and political concerns. Id. at 1473. By contrast, Lockett simply
involved the detection of PCB contamination above an already established regulated
level of 50 ppm. No concern over establishing an appropriate standard for regulation
was present. For a discussion of Lockett, see supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Confusion in the courts over applying
the Berkovitz test to governmental failure to warn of environmental hazards can partly be
attributed to the inability of both judges and plaintiffs to separate properly the failure to
warn claim from any other claims made. In Lockett, for example, the plaintiffs' claim
included not only that the EPA had failed in its duty to warn, but also that the EPA was
negligent in failing to inspect the sight after 1981 and in failing to clean up the site.
Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 1991). The court then treated
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haps EPA's exercise of discretion in this instance should prevent an
attack upon the agency for failing to issue a penalty to the site oper-
ator, to seek an injunction against plant operation, or to clean up
immediately the detected hazard. This type of discretion is the type
the exception is aimed at protecting. The discretion to concentrate
on waste-oil hauling, however, should not immunize the EPA's neg-
ligence in failing to warn applicable parties of the PCB hazard in
their area.'1 5 In Lockett, the EPA did not claim, nor could it claim,
that a hazard was not detected or not understood. Given the EPA's
general charge to protect the public, considerations of economic,
social, or political concerns cannot justify a failure to warn of the
hazard." 16 One might assert arguments based on an economic con-
sideration that justify the failure to warn."17 Such arguments, how-
these claims as a single claim of negligence for EPA inaction and found the discretionary
function exception applicable to elements of this inaction. 938 F.2d at 638-39.
115 This is more evident when the failure to warn is seen as a separate issue. See
Stilo, supra note 5, at 613-14 ("The more equitable approach considers failure to warn as
a separate and discrete issue, independent of other regulatory acts and decisions, and
looks to state tort law principles to determine liability."); see also Zumwalt v. United
States, 928 F.2d 951, 955 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a failure to warn claim
should be considered separately from a claim of failure to implement agency policies);
Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 n.5-a (10th Cir. 1976) (differentiating between
policy decisions and separate determinations about safety devices and warnings); Harry
L. Dorsey et al., 1990 Contract Law Developments-The Year in Review, 1991-Feb. ARmy
LAW. 3 (several circuits have uniformly recognized a failure to warn claim as a separate
and distinct tort theory in government contractor defense issues).
By analogy, many courts have recognized a failure to warn claim as a separate cause
of action in products liability. See, e.g., Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d
352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Huber v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465
(Minn. 1988); McCauley v. City of San Diego, 190 Cal. App. 3d 981 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);
Mackey v. Maremount Corp., 504 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
116 As discussed previously, a central purpose of the EPA is to protect both the pub-
lic health and the environment. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
117 An example of such an argument can be seen in Barnson v. United States, 816
F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987), in which the failure by the
government to warn uranium mine workers of the dangers of radiation was protected
from liability by the exception. The exception applied because the government's deci-
sion was based on its concern that the miners, if harmed, would refuse to work, thereby
endangering the nation's uranium supply. This argument, however, is not applicable to
the situation described in Lockett since no national economic factor was endangered by a
warning to the eventual plaintiffs. The site of the hazard, Carter Industrial's scrap yard,
presented no substantial national economic factor and was only involved in the reclama-
tion of old electrical transformers. Lockett, 938 F.2d at 631.
An argument that does apply to the Lockett situation is the EPA's fear of public over-
reaction to the warning of an environmental hazard. Although the EPA has not made
such a claim, this might be seen as both an economic and a social consideration. Be-
cause the EPA's purpose is to protect the public and the environment, however, a tenu-
ous concern for public overreaction should not overcome the need for a public warning.
See Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[Ilt is difficult to
imagine the [government] justifying a decision not to issue a simple warning to domestic
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ever, lack force when compared to the realistic need of the public to
be warned of such environmental hazards.' 18
C. Protecting the EPA's Failure to Warn at an Operational
Level Inhibits Proper Incentives for Reasonable
Agency Action
Following the Court's rulings in Varig Airlines and Berkovitz, the
legal significance of the planning/operational distinction articulated
in Indian Towing was uncertain. 19 The Court, however, answered
bystanders of such potentially devastating danger, based on economic or other policy
grounds.").
An analogous situation in which public safety is found more important than the fear
of public overreaction is the Federal Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988). This Act
requires meetings of agency heads to be held in public unless exempted under the stat-
ute. The purpose of the Act is to ensure public access to agency information and to
provide an additional political check on agency action. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL
AsIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 554-57 (1989). The concern over
public reaction to sensitive information is not allowed to overcome the Sunshine Act
even though "[t]here is a natural tendency for agency heads and staff to prefer that their
tentative discussions about politically sensitive matters be kept out of the public eye."
Id. at 557.
118 See supra note 79 (discussing the dangers of PCB contamination and the EPA's
concern for this hazard).
A recent case, while rejecting government liability, more clearly presents the need
for public warnings of environmental hazards. In Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988), plaintiffs brought suit against the
government, alleging over 500 deaths and injuries resulted from open-air atomic bomb
tests in Nevada during the 1950s and 1960s. The plaintiffs claimed the government was
negligent for failing to warn the public and for failing to provide public information
about radioactive fallout. A reluctant court reversed the district court's finding of gov-
ernment liability, holding that all of the government's attacked action and inaction fell
within the discretionary function exception. Id. at 1427. The magnitude of the claims in
Allen shows the need of a relying public to be warned of such environmental hazards.
For a criticism of Allen and its outcome, see DAVIs, supra note 5, § 27:12-1 (supp.
1983) (noting that simple instruction of measures like wearing a hat, showering or bath-
ing, or laundering clothes would have been effective in reducing the harm caused by the
fallout); see also D.J. GA.LtGAN, DISCRETIONARY PowERs: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL
DiscR, noN 179 (1986) (The need for precise standards is greatest in such areas as
safety regulation in nuclear power plants and aspects of the environment since "in such
circumstances the risks in allowing decisions to be made on a more incremental basis are
too great, considering the damage that may result from the smallest errors.").
119 See Chamberlin v. Isen, 779 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1985) ("This circuit aban-
doned the planning/operational level distinction in light of Varig's focus on the 'nature
of the conduct in question.' "); Flammia v. United States, 739 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.
1984) (no liability for INS's "specific operational decision" to permit a Cuban refugee
known to be a convicted felon to enter the U.S.); cf. Henderson v. United States, 784
F.2d 942, 943 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (FTCA liability possible for government missile facil-
ity's safety decision not made at the planning stage, but "operational in nature"); Ala-
bama Electric Coop. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) ("yarig
Airlines actually supports the planning/operational distinction when that distinction is
properly understood."); Barash, supra note 5, at 1319 ("The planning versus operational
test is basically a sound, common sense inquiry, and it is doubtful that the Court in-
tended to jettison it entirely without making such an intention explicit."); Donald N.
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any question about this distinction's propriety in a recent decision
concerning whether the discretionary function exception protected
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's (FHLBB) actions. In United
States v. Gaubert,120 the Court held that the FHLBB's supervision of a
savings and loan association's daily operations involved the exercise
of public policy discretion and that the discretionary function excep-
tion shielded it from tort action.1 21 The Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim that action occurring at the operational level of agency
programs was outside the discretionary function exception. In the
Court's opinion, "[d]iscretionary conduct is not confined to the pol-
icy or planning level" and includes the "[d]ay-to-day management
of banking affairs."1 22 As long as the action involved was a matter of
choice and based on economic, social, or political considerations, it
was within the perimeters of the discretionary function exception,
regardless of the level of agency action involved.' 23 In sum, the
Gaubert decision appears to eliminate any inquiry into a plan-
ning/operational distinction when considering the applicability of
the discretionary function exception to agency action.1 24
Accepting that the planning/operational distinction is no
longer valid, the courts still have reason to inquire into the level of
agency action involved when the EPA fails to warn of a known envi-
ronmental hazard. Most often, such failures to warn would occur
Zillman, Regulatory Discretion: The Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 110 MIL. L. REv. 115 (1985) (suggesting the planning
versus operational test is not conclusively dead after Varig and might be used to deter-
mine which policy judgments are protected).
120 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
121 Id. at 1279-80. The particular action challenged by the plaintiffs was the federal
agency's selection and replacement of new officers and directors of the savings and loan
association and its participation in the association's daily management. Id. at 1272.
122 Id. at 1275.
123 Id. at 1278-79. In reaching its decision, the Court unconvincingly denied that
previous cases such as Dalehite and Indian Towing created the planning/operational dis-
tinction in the first place. Id. at 1275-76. This ignores the language of these cases and
the treatment of the discretionary function exception in the 30 years that followed. See
supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (discussing Dalehite and Indian Towing).
124 But see id. at 1280-82 (Scalia, J., concurring):
[Tihe level at which the decision is made is often relevant to the discre-
tionary function inquiry, since the answer to that inquiry turns on both the
subject matter and the office of the decisionmaker.
... Ordinarily, an employee working at the operational level is not
responsible for policy decisions, even though policy considerations may
be highly relevant to his actions.
... Moreover, not only is it necessary for application of the discre-
tionary function exception that the decisionmaker be an official who pos-
sesses the relevant policy responsibility, but also the decisionmaker's
close identification with policymaking can be strong evidence that the
other half of the test is met-i.e., that the subject-matter of the decision is
one that ought to be informed by policy considerations.
Id. at 1280-81.
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when a lower-level employee1 25 fails to take the proper steps to pro-
vide public notice of the hazard.1 26 The EPA exercises considerable
discretion through formulating policy in several circumstances: de-
ciding which substances are toxic or hazardous; ascertaining what
levels of these substances present a substantial threat to public
health; and determining actions or penalties for violations of these
standards.' 27 Providing additional protection of discretion exer-
cised when lower-level employees act under these policies removes
much of the incentive for agency employees to execute programs or
policies with reasonable care. If discretion at all levels is shielded
equally from any tort liability, an agency has little incentive to insure
that lower-level employees will carry out its programs or policy deci-
sions without negligence.' 28 As a result of this protection, there is
no functioning mechanism to prompt the agency to carry out its op-
eration properly. 29
Those harmed by a failure to warn, especially in situations like
that in Lockett, have little, if any, political recourse against the
agency's actions or inactions. 130 As an executive agency, no part of
the EPA is directly elected by populous vote. Although Congress
must confirm the administrator's appointment, the executive branch
selects the administrator without direct input from the general pub-
125 Lower-level employees in this context means non-policymaking employees.
126 See, e.g., Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 630-32 (6th Cir. 1991) (indicat-
ing that only three employees, local inspectors of no major policy formulating authority,
were involved in the investigation and decisionmaking that led to the failure to warn by
the EPA).
127 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1992) (showing application of these decisions to the
regulation of PCBs).
128 See Krent, supra note 5, at 893 ("The possibility that officials will be disciplined by
their superiors always exists, but by itself constitutes a relatively weak check against
wrongdoing."); id. at 889 n.81 ("Supervisors may not know of the negligence, supervi-
sors may condone the negligence, or supervisors may value the employee to such an
extent that discipline for the negligent acts is unlikely.").
129 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 88-89 (1983) (immunity rules impede cost-shifting, allowing government to
escape the burden of official misconduct); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, In
the 1990's the Government Must be a Reasonable Person in its Workplaces: The Discretionary Func-
tion Immunity Shield Must be Trimmed, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 371 (1989) (stating that
if the discretionary function exception is reduced to more reasonable boundaries, "the
[federal] government will have incentives to avoid liability" if it "jeopardizes the health
and safety of persons in workplaces it owns, operates, or controls"); Stilo, supra note 5,
at 613 (A balancing approach to the discretionary function exception would "encourage
the exercise of reasonable care by government agencies."); cf. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTEUST 130-34 (1980) (criticizing Congress for delegating expansive authority to
less politically accountable agencies).
130 Krent, supra note 5, at 892-93 ("[W]hile a loose political check may constrain the.
initial delegation decision, no comparable check influences the subsequent exercise of
delegated authority.").
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lic.13 1 Similarly, the public exerts little influence on the hiring of
most officials and employees within the agency.
In contrast, those who are adversely affected economically by
the setting of a particular emissions standard, for example, often
have greater political recourse than members of the general public.
Manufacturers or industrialists often have influential lobbying
groups that can influence congressional approval of key administra-
tors or congressional adoption of statutory regulations governing
the EPA.1 32 These parties generally maintain the political power
and monetary means to be heard to a far greater extent than the
general public.'33 The protection of EPA decisions, such as the es-
tablishment of emissions standards, through the discretionary func-
tion exception, does not preclude recourse for parties adversely
affected. Thus, even without relying on a planning/operational dis-
tinction when examining agency action, a court should still examine
the level of action involved to determine if any reasonable political
or governmental incentives exist at that level to encourage reason-
able care by agency employees when carrying out programs or
policies. 34
To summarize, three reasons suggest that the discretionary
function exception should not mechanically cover the EPA's failures
to warn of environmental hazards. First, the reasons for establish-
ing the EPA and its central purpose to protect the public health and
the environment imply that the agency has a duty to warn about
such hazards. Furthermore, specific congressional directives and
EPA regulations suggest the EPA has a mandatory duty to warn citi-
zens when it detects an environmental hazard. Second, even if no
mandatory duty to warn exists, the discretion involved in failing to
warn of environmental hazards is more properly characterized as a
safety concern, and not as one based on economic, social, or polit-
ical considerations. Finally, extending the discretionary function ex-
131 See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C app. at
1343 (1988) ("The Administrator shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.").
132 See Jack L. Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst
EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVrL. L. REV. 285, 302 (1985) ("Responding to pressure from
industry lobbying, and to executive policy, the Environmental Protection Agency at-
tempted to apply the bubble concept in each of the Clean Air Act's three permit pro-
grams ...."). For an example of a lobbying group in action, see Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc.
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
133 Also, these groups are better organized than a random selection of individuals
and can, therefore, create more forceful collective action. These groups can also avoid
the "free rider" problem which is inevitable in any attempt at general community action.
See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTON 23-24 (1991); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
134 See supra note 124 (discussing Justice Scalia's concern for continued recognition
by the courts of the level of agency action or decision involved).
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ception to the failure to warn, without examining the level of action
involved, removes incentives for lower-level agency employees to
'execute agency programs and policies with reasonable care. These
arguments suggest that courts dealing with situations similar to
Lockett should not mechanically apply the discretionary function ex-
ception to the EPA's failure to warn of ascertained environmental
hazards.
IV
JUDICiAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
A. Judicial Review of Agency Failure to Warn Does Not Inhibit
Proper Policy Formation
One of the strongest arguments in favor of the discretionary
function exception is that it prevents judicial "second guessing" of
agency policy determinations and programs.13 5 By preventing judi-
cial intrusions into the discretion accorded the agency, except when
the agency acts arbitrarily or capriciously, 136 the agency performs its
duties without the inhibiting fear ofjudicial interference or the pos-
sibility of civil penalty.13 7 That is, some might agree that protecting
agency discretion based on economic, political, and social concerns
is essential for agency operation. Otherwise, it might be argued, the
agency would be forced to over-plan, over-investigate, and over-
research in order to protect itself from the possibility of error lead-
ing to some type of judicially mandated recourse.
This protection, however, is unnecessary when a court deals
with the EPA's failure to warn of a known environmental hazard.
When analyzing the agency's failure to warn, a court relies on the
EPA's own established policies, such as allowable emissions and
toxic substance levels or investigation techniques. Such policies are
properly given the protection of the discretionary function excep-
tion. 138 The policy reasons behind the exception, however, do not
extend to an agency's negligent failure to warn, since analyzing such
135 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988).
136 See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (finding deference should be given to
the EPA if its interpretation of statute is reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious).
137 Krent, supra note 5, at 895 ("Permitting judicial oversight of executive branch
policy decisions through tort suits would . . . threaten to frustrate agency policy
making.").
138 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. These types of decisions are, of course,
not totally free of any meaningful oversight. Congress is free to impose on the agency
mandatory directives if it feels the agency has established an unreasonable regulation.
See generally BONFIELD & ASIMOW, supra note 117, at 493-94 (explaining that Congress
can use a notice requirement to influence agency action and enact a statute to prevent,
alter, or cancel a rule).
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a claim only requires the court to make a basic negligence determi-
nation based upon the agency's own guidelines.' 3 9
B. Separation of Powers Does Not Require Unchecked Agency
Action or Inaction
The constitutional principle of separation of powers arguably
provides another justification for the discretionary function excep-
tion.140 According to this view, the judiciary branch breaches the
separation of powers ideal when it reviews the exercise of discretion
that the executive branch granted to an agency. A judicial determi-
nation that an agency acted improperly is believed to represent a
judicial attempt to influence or check the agency's policy, a role del-
egated to the executive branch with approval by the legislative
branch.'4' Inherent in the concept of separation of powers is the
notion that each branch of government will operate as a "check" on
the power of the other branches. 142 The discretionary function ex-
ception, it is argued, will remove this constitutional check when cer-
tain types of agency action are involved.
By extending the discretionary function exception to its current
boundaries, however, the courts have actually over-protected the gov-
ernment.143 Over-protection results because the exception removes
any check on agency action that may go unchecked by the agency
itself. 144 Professor Harold Krent argues that application of the dis-
cretionary function exception should not hinge on the "nature of
139 For example, the court in Lockett could measure the actual danger created by the
PCB contamination by looking to the EPA's own definition of unreasonably dangerous
levels of PCBs. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussion of Lockett); see
also Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 794-95 (1st Cir. 1989) (referring to the
Navy's own recognition of the dangers of asbestos in discussing the actual danger about
which the government failed to warn); supra note 71 (giving examples of courts holding
agencies to regulatory duties).
140 See Barash, supra note 5, at 1327 ("First, and probably foremost, the discretionary
function exception promotes the separation of powers by limiting judicial scrutiny of
executive decisions."); Krent, supra note 5, at 894-95 ("The discretionary function ex-
ception unquestionably preserves the allocation of powers among the branches." With-
out the exception, the "judiciary would become the final arbiter of 'good' government.")
(footnote omitted).
141 Krent, supra note 5, at 905 ("Courts cannot evaluate the agency officials' overall
regulatory priorities, allocation of resources, and estimates of regulatory effectiveness
without arrogating much of the administrative function to themselves."); see also Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962-63 (1983) (explaining that,
although the Constitution does not contemplate three branches of government, each
with precise boundaries, one branch may not interfere with another's constitutional
powers).
142 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119-23 (1976) (arguing that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers was developed to prevent any branch of government from wielding its
power unchecked by the other branches).
143 Krent, supra note 5, at 873.
144 See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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the governmental action challenged (as it currently does under
Berkovitz), but on the process by which that action is reached."' 145
When formulating policies and programs, the agency is equipped
with its own internal checks, such as deliberation and debate, as well
as statutory checks, such as the requirement of public hearings in
some contexts.1 46 Many agency decisions, particularly those most
often made by employees as individuals, especially at the opera-
tional level, are not subject to these internal agency checks. 147 In
these cases, there is no deliberation, debate, or public input to guide
the decision-maker or the agency. Therefore, given the current
state of the discretionary function exception, these actions or inac-
tions go unchecked.' 48 Professor Krent argues that the judiciary
does not violate separation of powers when it provides a check for
otherwise unchecked action. 149 The courts offer an acceptable back-
stop for this type of agency action when no other check exists.
145 Krent, supra note 5, at 874.
146 IdL at 900; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(2)(C) (1988) (EPA shall provide opportu-
nity for informal hearing when determining regulations for possible toxic substances).
147 Krent, supra note 5, at 899 ("If an agency relies only on an individual's judgment,
then the public cannot effectively participate in that decision."); see also supra notes 126-
31 and accompanying text (discussing public inability to affect low-level agency actions);
infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing ineffective internal agency checks
on employee action). See generally Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983:
Some Lessons From Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. LJ. 1753, 1773-74 (1989)
(arguing that a stronger check on agency action may come from holding the agency
responsible for acquiescing in inappropriate subordinate employee actions).
148 An argument might be made that this action is not wholly unchecked given the
existence of normal employee "checks" such as demotion, dismissal, or reprimand
within the agency. The sufficiency of these checks in controlling employee negligence or
improper action, however, has been severely questioned by commentators. See Bruce D.
Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RuTrrGERS
L. REv. 355, 368 (1991) (Supervisors or "collateral" employees, "whose job is to osten-
sibly provide an internal check on agency integrity . . .are known to have a certain
philosophical 'bent.' These individuals can also rationalize official conduct-some
might use the word 'whitewash'-that is of doubtful propriety."); Krent, supra note 5, at
889 n.81 (claiming that the "possibility of discipline does not generally supply a satisfac-
tory check. Supervisors may not know of the negligence, supervisors may condone the
negligence, or supervisors may value the employee to such an extent that discipline for
the negligent acts is unlikely."); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HAv. L. REv. 421, 508-09 (1987) ("Because they lack internal checks and balances,
administrative agencies pose special risks. . . . Dangers of factionalism and self-
interested representation have been the foremost concern of modem administrative law.
Most proposals for regulatory reform, whether judicial, executive, or legislative, stem
from that preoccupation.").
149 Krent, supra note 5, at 899 ("[N]ondeliberative action[s]" are unlikely to "reflect
the agency's mission to act as Congress' partner in fashioning national policy. Judicial
review in that context is unlikely to disturb any policy making function.") (footnote
omitted); see also Barash, supra note 5, at 1327 (arguing that the separation of powers
concern is nonexistent when considering the tort liability for negligent execution of
mandatory regulations: "['Flhejudiciary has always sought to hold the executive to its
own declared policies .... ).
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In addition, when the judiciary acts as a check on unrestrained
agency action, it corrects a possible lack of incentive. As discussed
above, 150 an unchecked actor may have little incentive to take rea-
sonable care when carrying out directives. With a judiciary check in
place, the actor and the directing agency will have the necessary in-
centive to insure that programs and policies are implemented with
reasonable care. 151
CONCLUSION
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act was designed to elimi-
nate the idea of sovereign immunity by allowing for governmental
liability, the discretionary function exception, by necessity, carves
out a part of government operation and removes it from general
liability. The discretionary function exception is an important
mechanism that allows federal agencies to make public policy deci-
sions through statutorily authorized discretion. Such discretion
removes the fear of constant judicial interference in agency activity
through the threat of tort liability. This Note has argued, however,
that courts have extended the exception beyond its functional ne-
cessity and, as a result, that courts have over-protected the govern-
ment and its discretionary functions. This over-protection is most
clearly seen in the willingness of the courts to classify the EPA's fail-
ure to warn of ascertained environmental hazards as within the dis-
cretionary function exception. 52
150 See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
151 Krent, supra note 5, at 915 ("With respect to deterrence, the federal government
should, if possible, be forced to internalize the costs of accidents unless the political and
administrative process has provided adequate safeguards.").
152 For commentators calling for change in the application of the discretionary func-
tion exception, see SCHUCK, supra note 129, at 114 ("Precisely because virtually all ac-
tions are 'discretionary' in some sense, the term should be restricted to non-routine,
essentially judgmental, policy-type decisions."); Krent, supra note 5, at 915 ("Instead of
stressing the nature of the governmental action, courts should focus on the decision
making process underlying the governmental action challenged."); Reynolds, supra note
13, at 481 (calling for the Supreme Court to reconsider the basic purpose of the
FTCA-"to make the government liable to those it tortiously injures"--through proper
application of the planning v. operational test.); Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and
Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the Discretionary Function Exception and to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687, 739:
The number and complexity of discretionary function cases suggest that
Congress might usefully examine whether section 2680(a) is serving con-
gressional purposes.... Congress could benefit both government agen-
cies and plaintiffs by clarifying some of the rules of the game. In doing
so, Congress could also recognize that some discretionary function ques-
tions that have been played out in the courts in recent years (usually with
plaintiffs receiving an ultimate dismissal on section 2680(a) grounds)
should be handled by Congress.
id.; Stilo, supra note 5, at 612-13 (advocating an approach to the application of the dis-
cretionary function exception by balancing between the foreseeability and seriousness of
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To extend the exception to a failure to warn by the EPA is to
ignore the type of discretion at work when such a failure occurs.
Almost always this failure is not the result of carefully deliberated
concern over public policy, but instead the result of simple negli-
gence or lack of care.15 3 More importantly, classifying this failure as
one involving protected discretion detracts from the basic purpose
of the EPA: to protect a general public unequipped to protect itself
from environmental hazards. Therefore, cases such as Lockett have
been wrongly decided because they were based upon a faulty prem-
ise. The litigation in Lockett should have continued to the ultimate
question of governmental liability because the. discretionary func-
tion exception should not mechanically cover the EPA's failure to
warn of known environmental hazards. Similar cases, which are sure
to arise in the future, must be approached from a more realistic
analysis of the role of the EPA and the dangers of overextending the
discretionary function exception.
Jamon A. Jarvis
the injury and the burden of imposing a duty to warn); see also Allen v. United States, 816
F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (10th Cir. 1987) (McKay, J., concurring) (expressing concern that
the discretionary function exception is interpreted to apply "in all but the most trivial of
matters"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). But see David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer,
The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Vang to
Berkovitz, 25 IDAHo L. REv. 291, 328 (1988-89) (arguing that the current application of
the discretionary function exception is a "sensible framework, rooted firmly in congres-
sional intent. Consequently, the approach taken by most of the appellate decisions after
Varig was a sound one, and it would be unwise and unnecessary for that handiwork to be
undone."); Tomea C. Mayer, Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Sword or Shieldfor Recov-
ery from the Government for Negligent Hazardous Waste Disposal, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 173, 194 (1991) ("Despite the emotional and environmental impact of
hazardous waste issues .... allow[ing] an FTCA claim to police the implementation of
general policy... oversteps the bounds of the Berkovitz decision.").
Interestingly, a proposal for amending the discretionary function exception recently
came before the House Subcommittee on the Judiciary. H.R. 2536 would amend the
FTCA to apply the exception "only if the discretionary function or duty involves the
formulation of policy rather than the implementation of the policy at an operational
level." H.R. 2536, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This proposal is currently pending
before the Subcommittee.
153 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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